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MR. DIMITRI SIMES
President, The Nexon Center
PLENARY SESSION V
“Prospects for Peace in the 21st
Century”
It is my great pleasure and privilege to be with you today to discuss this complex and not always pleasant topic of international politics at the beginning of this century.
About 10 years ago, I was in Moscow working for the Carnegie Endowment. My boss at the time was Ambassador Mort Abramowitz, president of the Endowment, former ambassador to Turkey, and former assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research. We went to see Eduard Shevardnadze, who at that time was a private citizen living not in Tbilisi but in Moscow and who was chairman of the Foreign Policy Association.
Mr. Abramowitz asked Shevardnadze how he visualized the U.S.-Russian relationship. The Soviet Union had just collapsed. It looked absolutely wonderful in terms of prospects for global peace and harmony. But the U.S.-Russian relationship was already somewhat contentious, and it was not quite clear what direction Russia was taking, particularly because there was confrontation between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet.
Shevardnadze said, “Look, all these problems, all these disagreements, between Russia and the United States are temporary. The Americans and the Russians, whether they like it or not, are bound to work together because they face a common threat.”
“And what is that?” asked Ambassador Abramowitz.
“Why are you asking? It is self-evident! Muslim fundamentalism! That is threatening both countries! Today it is threatening Russia, but tomorrow it is bound to threaten the United States.”
Abramowitz said, “Where do you see this Muslim fundamentalism doing so well? I was ambassador to Turkey, and I can assure you that there is no chance that fundamentalists are going to take over that country. And they were defeated in major Arab countries. Even Iran,” he said, “was becoming a little more moderate.”
“Well, Mr. Ambassador,” Shevardnadze said, “I understand your perspective. You have studied these people. You met a lot of their leaders. I am sure you know what you are talking about.” He said, “My perspective doesn’t just come from being a former Soviet minister. It doesn’t come from being a former Georgian leader. It comes from centuries and centuries of living in that neighborhood.” He said, “I do not have a strong intellectual cause to make to you, but I know deep down in my bones that the challenge is about to emerge.”
Well, it did emerge. This is a very powerful challenge. Let’s make no mistake what September 11 was about. Obviously it was about a group of terrorist extremists who were prepared to sacrifice their own lives and thousands and thousands of innocent lives to hurt the United States. But that’s the top of the pyramid.
What you see is a question of resurgent radical Islam. Certainly not every Muslim fundamentalist is prepared to become a suicide bomber or even to support suicide bombers. But it is quite clear that there are millions and millions of people, and thousands and thousands of members of Muslim elites, who have profound distaste not only for the United States but for modern civilization in general. They are looking for ways to fight it. Hopefully, most of them would agree that what was done on September 11 was inappropriate, extreme, counterproductive, evil, but they are looking for other ways to hurt modern civilization.
Then, of course, there is the huge bottom of the pyramid, which is not limited to Islam. It is about hundreds of millions of people living in countries that do not like the notion of the United States being the sole superpower. They do not like too many decisions being made in Washington. And they don’t understand that their own opportunity to checkmate the United States today is very, very limited. But they are eager to find a way to be counted, if for no other reason than because they don’t like too many decisions being made by somebody else on their behalf.
Yesterday I took part from Washington in a Russian TV program about the United States, Iraq, and the U.S.-Russian relationship. One of the people taking part in this program was an unpleasant, obnoxious person who is the Iraqi ambassador to Russia. I have to say that it was painful to me to hear that he clearly got much more applause than I during our not so pleasant exchanges. I didn’t take it personally because I could hear that there were people there in the studio speaking against the United States in general, but they were not doing as well in terms of audience response as those who were saying that Russia and America have to stand together against Saddam.
Whether you agree or disagree with the current administration, we have to agree that Saddam is an evil tyrant. Russia does not want to be marginalized with somebody like Saddam against the United States and against the free world.
Later I was talking to a friend of mine who was also part of that debate—and, I have to admit, not on my side—the chairman of the Russian parliament’s, the Duma’s, International Affairs Committee. He said to me, “You have to understand that those of us who are not supporting the American administration in Iraq certainly are not admirers of Saddam Hussein! We are certainly aware that he is a bloody tyrant. There were very few people in the audience who would want him to stay in power. Our problem,” he said, “was with the notion that a decision of such magnitude could be made in Washington, by the Bush administration, without much regard for Russian opinion, Chinese opinion, or anybody else’s opinion.”
He said, “Realize that it is more important for the United States to resolve the situation with Saddam than for Russia. Accordingly,” he said, “Russia is not going to stand in the way. It is not going to turn into a Russian-American conflict. But boy,” he said, “it doesn’t feel good after being a superpower for so many years now to understand how irrelevant we, meaning the Russians, have become! It is not a pleasant feeling.”
Many nations basically understand that the United States is generally on the side of the NGOs and that the United States is a remarkably benign superpower, that identify with many American foreign policy actions and admire the American kind of democracy. But still they have reservations about the situation when democracy is defined by American commitment to human rights but is not defined by what they believe is necessary respect for their own country’s right to decide what kind of government they have, to have their own cycle of development and their own mistakes.
As you can see, it is a difficult, complex situation. On one level it is quite clear that the United States has unparalleled power. The Chinese, the Russians, even the French, to say nothing about the British, realize that America has not only unbelievable, unparalleled military political power, but also it has economic and cultural appeal. I think most nations really want to accept American leadership—sometimes with reservations, sometimes with minor quarrels, but I think they are inclined to accept American leadership. But at the same time they want to play a role and make sure that when they follow American leadership their concerns, their perspectives, are also taken into account.
That creates quite a dilemma for American policymakers. If we want to have an effective struggle against terrorism, we need the active participation of other countries. Not just a pro forma calculation but a serious calculation on the basis of intelligence information, and sometimes even participation in military operations. The trouble is that people who are prepared to do that for the United States have their own concerns and perspectives. Some of them are very close to American concerns and perspectives. There is not much difference between the United States and Great Britain’s concerns, for example. There is some difference in attitude, perhaps, to Irish terrorism, but not much. There is no fundamental difference. A little more difference exists between the United States and France, and much more difference between the United States and China. In Russia, those people whom the Russians consider terrorists were only yesterday the Chechen rebels considered “freedom fighters” by the conventional wisdom in Washington. It is beginning to change. The administration is beginning to take a more sympathetic look at the Russian predicament in Chechnya. Indeed, the situation is very complex.
There is no question that what the Russians are doing in Chechnya is heavy-handed, inexcusable. If the Russian government did not order atrocities, it clearly has tolerated the acts committed by the Russian army without any serious punishment. It is also quite clear that the way the Russians have treated Chechens during the last two centuries—if you remember, Stalin expelled all Chechens from their republic in 1944 and about a third of the Chechen population died in the process, including women and children—makes it perfectly natural for the Chechens to fight the Russians. It is a legitimate struggle. At the same time, it is also clear that the way the Chechens went about the struggle was in many cases brutal, illegal, and even sometimes looked like outright terrorism, to which Russians and many foreigners were exposed. So how do you deal with this situation?
If you allow the Russians every hand, they will say that they are just fighting against terrorism and would create mischief in Georgia and try to overthrow the same Mr. Shevardnadze with whom I started and with whom I want to finish. Now he is a Georgian leader. He is still concerned about Muslim fundamentalism, but he is more concerned about the Russian big brother who is trying to destabilize the situation in his newly independent state, a state with a great historical tradition but still newly independent. So if you give Russia a free hand, you are in trouble. We should tell the Russians, “Now wait a second. Our struggle against al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein is simple, clear, and pure; we have a strong not only security but also moral argument. You are not quite so pure. And you are not entitled to deal with your abhorrent terrorist problem in Chechnya.”
I talked to Mr. Putin about that. I told him that the way his military was conducting itself in Chechnya was creating a lot of trouble for him with American public opinion and with civilized opinion in general. And he said, “You think that I don’t know that?” But, he said, “Don’t you know what terrible shape the Russian military is in? You don’t know that we lost our best officers? Nobody wants to be drafted into the Russian army, so we have people who are half illiterate or half criminal because everybody else is able to escape the draft. How can I force this kind of poorly trained, poorly funded, poor military to act like it was an American army?
“My choice is very simple,” he said. “Either I have to give up Chechnya in general—we tried it once and it did not work out very well because Chechnya became a terrorist hotbed during those three years of practical independence—or I have to fight with those generals and those soldiers who are good. And if you tell me that we are not entitled to do it, then you don’t sound like a true friend and a true ally.”
This is a serious problem: how to find the right balance in American foreign policy between holding the moral high ground, not allowing others to engage in all kinds of unsavory actions which they would call “anti-terrorism” and then do whatever, but at the same time remembering that if you want to be a leader you need people to follow you. You need other major powers to be willing to cooperate with you. It is a very, very tough choice.
I am happy to say that I believe that this president has a combination of strong moral, religious commitment and the practical common sense of a business leader to find this essential middle ground, which is required for an effective struggle against terrorism and Muslim fundamentalism. Thank you.
